First the elements:

A fundamental investor seeks to make money off of the cash flows into the company.

A technical investor seeks to make money off of the cash flows into the stock.

My hybrid model seeks to make money off of good companies at a time that investors are beginning to notice it; when cash is flowing into the stock and the company at the same time.

The fundamental aspects are based on Joel Greenblatt’s “Little Book that Beats the Market.” Although he tested it beating the market by 30% a year, my own tests have basically confirmed those of Validea.com and Haugen – it does beat the market, but at closer to 10-15% than 30.

The technical aspects are based on my sector adaptations of Len Mansky’s work. He’s a private investor with an uncanny ability to time up and down movements of the market.

Back tests of my sector adaptations show 20-25% annual returns.

The goal of my hybrid model was to add the minimum performance advantage of Greenblatt’s fundamentals (10% minimum) to the minimum performance of my sector adaptations of Len Mansky (20% minimum). The target outperformance, then, was to beat the S&P by 30%.

So far, the model is a complete success, beating the S&P by an annual rate of 30%. Unfortunately, as I noted in my previous post, the S&P is losing money at a faster rate than that.

Now the problems:

Market timing has become a precarious position during the Bernanke tenure. The end of QE1 catapulted us into a premature bear market in 2010 that was suddenly cancelled by QE2. The resultant flow of US dollars has destabilized entire governments in the Middle East, which are toppling because of inflation in the price of food. People put up with their dictators until they can no longer afford to eat. Then it’s either a fast death from a battle with the government or a slow death of starvation. Starvation wins that competition for most folks (remember Marie Antoinette’s famous quip “Let them eat cake”; to which they responded by chopping off her head).

Worst for us is the toppling of the Euro into a deflationary spiral.

Quantitative Easing creates abnormal market conditions.

Deflation sets those market conditions on their head.

One cannot, therefore, be entirely sure WHAT is truly happening out there.

Venezuela is now demanding its gold reserves held in European banks (of which JP Morgan also has exposure). That wouldn’t be a problem if the banks actually HAD the gold. They don’t. Those banks are leveraged up to 10 to 1, and don’t have enough of the metal to pay. Venezuela can topple the entire house of cards like a small gust of wind.

The United States M2 money supply has also exploded in the last two months as European deposits are being pulled out and pushed into American treasuries and cash. Once that is complete we’ll face massive inflation in the United States (payback for the inflation we exported to the third world during QE2), while Europe descends into a deflationary spiral. We will NOT escape if that happens – we’ll have a massive inflationary bubble followed immediately by our own deflationary spiral: basically wiping out everyone’s savings AND their ability to earn an income (and wiping out 99% of market timers who will short when the market rallies and go long when the market collapses – losing in both directions). Perhaps someone like Soros could win in such an environment, but I see that even Soros is scared into retiring.

Buffet himself called for higher taxes on billionaires, knowing full well that his assets are tied into UNREALIZED (and therefore untaxable) gains. The reason for his op-ed was not to actually generate money for the government but instead to stave off investor panic with a smokescreen.

And it is a smokescreen. We are poised over a deflationary abyss. My own S&P forecasts are the most rosy I can conjure. The base yield ratio model has a bottom of 94.49 on the S&P (that’s NOT a typo). With the 3month note pegged at .01%, there is NOTHING that can flatten the yield curve – not even a QE3. I’ve “corrected” that forecast by averaging it with a typical Presidential cycle to get a 684.16 bottom. The 970 number is based on the progression in sector rotation (we are 2/5ths into a bear sector rotation, and so would be 2/5s of the way through the decline).

Again, I keep posting 970 because the other numbers are too bad. But 970 is bad enough.

So, how DOES a hybrid model invest in such an environment? Shorting is as perilous as staying long, and (as I’ve experienced first hand) shorting fundamentally bad companies can blow up in your face if they get bought out and skyrocket on you overnight. Besides, shorting fundamentally bad companies is really hard to do because those short allotments are already taken – and therefore I have been unwilling to share what few positions I could get into.

That leaves sectors. Although sectors have greater beta than the market as a whole, they will not double or triple on a morning gap. Also, the nine sector ETFs in my sector model are very heavily traded, and so I can share those short positions without eliminating my own ability to enter them.

In a bear market, then – one does not simply invest long or short, but both at the same time; eliminating the volatility and squeezing out returns. Since my model beats the S&P by 30% (even during a bear), shorting SPY is an option. But I’ve also been testing short positions on the model and found that during the testing period XLE and XLF were the two shorts I encountered, and both did even worse than the S&P.

The timed model, then, hedges Mousetrap selections against bad sectors, for a target performance of 30%. That’s 30% total return, mind you, and not merely S&P + 30%.

In a bear, the model hedges. In a bull, the model does not hedge.

Total performance during the testing period would have been as follows:

Position Date Return Days Call Hedge Hedge% Net
BKI 5/31/2011 -4.96% 82 Hold XLE -16.86% 11.90%
CFI 6/22/2011 -3.64% 60 Hold XLE -13.74% 10.10%
SE 6/27/2011 -9.11% 55 Hold XLF -17.82% 8.71%
AWR 7/5/2011 -3.64% 45 Closed XLE -16.86% 13.22%
CLH 7/6/2011 -12.25% 46 Hold XLE -17.37% 5.12%
GCI 7/14/2011 -26.16% 38 Hold XLE -16.07% -10.09%
AGO 8/5/2011 -7.27% 16 Hold XLE -7.99% 0.72%
DISH 8/10/2011 -1.20% 11 Buy XLE -3.38% 2.18%
NA NA NA NA NA
NA NA NA NA NA
Mousetrap Return -8.53%
S&P Return -12.20%
Hedged Return 5.23%

Mousetrap Annualized -70.60%
S&P Annualized -100.95%
Hedge Annualized 43.29%

Annualized Advantage 30.35%
Hedged Advantage 144.24%


Requirements of the model:

Since a fundamental model invests in a number of stocks, one cannot simply jump in and out of the market without paying huge trading costs. While someone could switch from long to short SPY with only two 9.99 costs (less than 20 dollars), a fundamental type of switching would cost at least ten times that much, and whipsawing would drastically consume a large portion of the returns.

I also needed a model that worked even when it was wrong – that is, a 30% return rate is still a healthy return rate even in a bull market. So, investing long into a bear reduces losses by 30%, while investing hedged into a bull limits gains to only 30%. The model satisfies the requirement of surviving wrong timing and broad market whipsaws by such “once in a lifetime events” as QE or Euro implosion.

The model needs to be something that other people could follow – using sectors as hedged shorts instead of individual companies allows this to happen.

The model needs to be safe from short blow ups caused by an acquisition during a bear market. I recently had a small short explode by several hundred percent. Even at only 10% of a hedged portfolio such an event would cause damage.

Finally, the model needs to gradually rotate. Since my own yield ratio and sector configuration timers are long term, I do not need to jump into and out of hedges. I will simply enter all new positions into a bear hedged, and all new positions into a bull un-hedged. And then remove or apply hedges as a new buy or sell position occurs. If Bernanke pulls another rabbit out of the hat, I do not need to make sudden changes myself, but merely rotate into them as market conditions change. Normally a major market change will create a sudden shift then a sharp reversal, then a continuation of the first move. My rotation will smooth out such manic moves.

How this changes my test:

I plan to apply the hedges and show unhedged and hedged returns (as above), starting from the time the hedges were actually entered. The numbers will represent real money, and not backtested hypotheticals (as above).

I am still looking for a slight bounce, and expect the hedged positions to UNDER perform if that bounce is a strong one. There’s not much I can do about that. The market had to collapse on me before I was able to complete all my testing and integration of the various aspects of the model. Going forward, the model should make 30% in a bear market, and more than 30% in a bull. While not into the Buffet realm, we have to remember that Bill Gates and Warren Buffet basically put all their chips into one stock and none of us can rely on those kinds of returns in a truly balanced portfolio.

Tim